Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1709068
 
 

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Electoral Misgovernance Cycles: Evidence from Wildfires and Tax Evasion in Greece and Elsewhere


Spyros Skouras


Athens University of Economics and Business - Department of International and European Economic Studies

Nikos Christodoulakis


affiliation not provided to SSRN

November 14, 2010


Abstract:     
We present detailed empirical evidence that around Greek elections, misgovernance results in significant increases in wildfires and tax evasion and with important economic implications: the cumulative cost of these effects in recent years has been over 8% of GDP and has therefore been a contributing factor to Greece’s debt crisis and any effect this has had on the global economy. We interpret this evidence as a type of misgovernance which arises from electoral cycles in two types of incumbent incentives: (i) to allocate effort or attention between governing vs. campaigning; and/or (ii) to adopt even very inefficient redistributive policies if they benefit special interests with a lead over when the costs are observed. While these incentives may manifest differently among countries, our analysis suggests that electoral cycles everywhere may be much more multifaceted and harmful than previous literature suggests.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

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Date posted: November 16, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Skouras, Spyros and Christodoulakis, Nikos, Electoral Misgovernance Cycles: Evidence from Wildfires and Tax Evasion in Greece and Elsewhere (November 14, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1709068 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1709068

Contact Information

Spyros Skouras (Contact Author)
Athens University of Economics and Business - Department of International and European Economic Studies ( email )
GR-10434 Athens
Greece
Nikos Christodoulakis
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Feedback to SSRN


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