Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity: The Role of Moral Hazard
James S. Costain
Bank of Spain - Research Department
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, Issue 4, pp. 782-811, December 2010
We study the cyclical dynamics of job creation and destruction when workers' effort is not perfectly observable. The no-shirking constraint may amplify fluctuations in hiring by making firms' surplus share procyclical, and may cause a burst of inefficient firing when a downturn begins. But quantitatively, it mainly raises the cost of motivating marginal workers in booms, since firms cannot commit to keep them in recessions, and thereby strongly damps the countercyclical fluctuations in the separation rate. This implies a robust Beveridge curve, but casts doubt on Ramey and Watson's (1997) “contractual fragility” mechanism and worsens Shimer's (2005a) “volatility puzzle”.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: November 16, 2010
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.531 seconds