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Relative Performance Evaluation in CEO Compensation: Evidence from the 2006 Disclosure Rules
David De Angelis
Rice University - Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business
Yaniv Grinstein
Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management
December 7, 2011
Johnson School Research Paper Series No. 39-2010
AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper
Abstract:
In December 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued new rules that require the disclosure of the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEO compensation contracts. We find that about a third of the sample firms use RPE in the CEO compensation contract. On average, RPE users tie about half of the estimated value of the awards to RPE. Firms tie a larger fraction of their awards to RPE when they face less uncertainty regarding the right performance benchmark. We find little evidence to support hypotheses based on product market competition, CEO hedging constraints, or managerial power.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 53
Keywords: CEO Compensation, Relative Performance Evaluation
JEL Classification: G34, G38, J33
working papers series
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Date posted: November 17, 2010
; Last revised: March 12, 2012
Suggested CitationDe Angelis, David and Grinstein, Yaniv, Relative Performance Evaluation in CEO Compensation: Evidence from the 2006 Disclosure Rules (December 7, 2011). Johnson School Research Paper Series No. 39-2010; AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1710386 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1710386
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