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Regulatory Induced Performance Persistence: Evidence from Hedge Funds


Douglas Cumming


York University - Schulich School of Business

Na Dai


State University of New York at Albany - School of Business & Center for Institutional Investment Management

Lars Helge Hass


Lancaster University Management School

Denis Schweizer


WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

November 17, 2010


Abstract:     
This paper tests the idea that financial regulation can impact performance persistence in the context of the hedge fund industry in 48 countries over the years 1994-2008. The data show evidence of three types of regulation influencing performance persistence: (1) minimum capital restrictions, which restrict lower quality funds and hence increase the likelihood of performance persistence, (2) restrictions on location of key service providers, which restrict human capital choices and hence tend to mitigate performance persistence, and (3) distribution channels, which make fund performance more opaque, decrease the likelihood of performance persistence. We do not find evidence that distribution channels, that promote fund presence to institutional investors, enhance performance persistence. Finally, we show differences in the effect of regulation on persistence by fund quartile ranking.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: Performance Persistence, Law and Finance, Hedge Funds

JEL Classification: G23, G24, G28, K22, M43

working papers series


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Date posted: November 20, 2010 ; Last revised: June 3, 2012

Suggested Citation

Cumming, Douglas J., Dai, Na, Hass, Lars Helge and Schweizer, Denis, Regulatory Induced Performance Persistence: Evidence from Hedge Funds (November 17, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1710786 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1710786

Contact Information

Douglas J. Cumming (Contact Author)
York University - Schulich School of Business ( email )
4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada
HOME PAGE: http://www.venturecapitalprivateequitycontracting.com/
Na Dai
State University of New York at Albany - School of Business & Center for Institutional Investment Management ( email )
1400 Washington Ave.
Albany, NY 12222
United States
Lars Helge Hass
Lancaster University Management School ( email )
Lancaster, LA1 4YX
United Kingdom
+44 1524 593981 (Phone)
+44 1524 847321 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/accounting/profiles/lars-helge-hass
Denis Schweizer
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )
Burgplatz 2
Vallender, 56179
Germany
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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