Shareholder Democracy in Canada

Randall Morck

University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

November 15, 2010

The federal government stands poised to exercise its constitutional right to regulate financial markets, an area traditionally left to competing provincial securities commissions. The current state of securities regulation renders impotent US-style takeover defences, such as poison pills and staggered boards, but allows voting caps and pyramiding in their stead. Various federal securities regulation models are weighted in light of the current state of their needed complementary institutions. One option, for which Canada is relatively well prepared, is the British model of activist independent institutional investors and mandatory takeover bids.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Canada, Securities Law

JEL Classification: G3, G38, G23, K22, N22, P5

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Date posted: November 20, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Morck, Randall, Shareholder Democracy in Canada (November 15, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1710905 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1710905

Contact Information

Randall K. Morck (Contact Author)
University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis ( email )
2-32C Business Building
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
780-492-5683 (Phone)
780-492-3325 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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