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Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets


John Armour


University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; University of Oxford - Said Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Colin Mayer


University of Oxford - Said Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Andrea Polo


University of Oxford - Said Business School

October 2010

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8058

Abstract:     
We study the impact of the announcement of enforcement of financial and securities regulation by the UK’s Financial Services Authority and London Stock Exchange on the market price of penalized firms. Since these agencies do not announce enforcement until a penalty is levied, their actions provide a uniquely clean dataset on which to examine reputational effects. We find that reputational sanctions are very real: their stock price impact is on average ten times larger than the financial penalties imposed. Furthermore, reputational losses are confined to misconduct that directly affects parties who trade with the firm (such as customers and investors). The announcement of a fine for wrongdoing that harms third parties has, if anything, a weakly positive effect on stock prices. Our results have significant implications for understanding both corporate reputation and regulatory policy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: Corporate Law, Enforcement, Regulation, Reputation

JEL Classification: G28, G38, K22, K42, L51

working papers series


Date posted: November 22, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Armour, John, Mayer, Colin and Polo, Andrea, Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets (October 2010). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8058. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1711071

Contact Information

John Armour (Contact Author)
University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )
Oriel College
Oxford, OX1 4EW
United Kingdom
+44 1865 286544 (Phone)
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Colin Mayer
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 1865 288112 (Phone)
+44 1865 288805 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Andrea Polo
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
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References:  32
Citations:  2

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