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Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial MarketsJohn ArmourUniversity of Oxford - Faculty of Law; University of Oxford - Said Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Colin MayerUniversity of Oxford - Said Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Andrea PoloUniversity of Oxford - Said Business School October 2010 CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8058 Abstract: We study the impact of the announcement of enforcement of financial and securities regulation by the UKs Financial Services Authority and London Stock Exchange on the market price of penalized firms. Since these agencies do not announce enforcement until a penalty is levied, their actions provide a uniquely clean dataset on which to examine reputational effects. We find that reputational sanctions are very real: their stock price impact is on average ten times larger than the financial penalties imposed. Furthermore, reputational losses are confined to misconduct that directly affects parties who trade with the firm (such as customers and investors). The announcement of a fine for wrongdoing that harms third parties has, if anything, a weakly positive effect on stock prices. Our results have significant implications for understanding both corporate reputation and regulatory policy.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46 Keywords: Corporate Law, Enforcement, Regulation, Reputation JEL Classification: G28, G38, K22, K42, L51 working papers seriesDate posted: November 22, 2010Suggested CitationContact Information
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