Abstract

 


 



New Boss Same as the Old Boss: A Look at the GM/UAW VEBA Post-IPO


Stephen F. Diamond


Santa Clara University - School of Law

November 19, 2010


Abstract:     
General Motor’s ability to exit bankruptcy through a public offering of its common stock (IPO) depended heavily on the sacrifices of active and retired members of the United Auto Workers (UAW). A review of the now public filings of GM related to the IPO indicate the significant concessions UAW retirees made to their health care plan, now nominally controlled by the UAW itself through a Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association, or VEBA. The VEBA remains joined at the hip for the foreseeable future to GM itself, yet breaking that dependency was the very purpose of the VEBA when it was first proposed to UAW members by GM and the UAW leadership. In that respect, this joint effort by the UAW and GM must be considered a failure.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 5

Keywords: General Motors, GM, UAW, United Auto Workers, VEBA, Auto Industry

JEL Classification: A10, D2, D6, E24, G3, G33, G34, G38, I1, J33, J38, J5, J51, K22, K31

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Date posted: November 22, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Diamond, Stephen F., New Boss Same as the Old Boss: A Look at the GM/UAW VEBA Post-IPO (November 19, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1712823 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1712823

Contact Information

Stephen F. Diamond (Contact Author)
Santa Clara University - School of Law ( email )
500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA 95053
United States
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