Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1712923
 
 

References (72)



 


 



Do Bond Issuers Shop for Favorable Credit Ratings?


Mathias Kronlund


University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

January 16, 2016


Abstract:     
I provide evidence of ratings shopping among corporate bonds. Firms are more likely to publish ratings from an agency that rates their bonds relatively favorably, and firms are also more likely to delay publication of any unfavorable ratings. This bias is strongest among junior and long-term bonds that are more complex to rate, and in times when the Baa--Aaa spread is high. I also show that firms strategically manage the number of ratings near a regulation-based threshold. Bonds with a shopping-biased rating are more likely to default, but investors account for this bias and demand higher yields for these bonds.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 65

Keywords: Ratings shopping, credit rating agencies, corporate bonds, regulation

JEL Classification: G10, G14, G18, G20, G28, G30, G38


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Date posted: November 22, 2010 ; Last revised: January 30, 2016

Suggested Citation

Kronlund, Mathias, Do Bond Issuers Shop for Favorable Credit Ratings? (January 16, 2016). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1712923 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1712923

Contact Information

Mathias Kronlund (Contact Author)
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )
1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
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