Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1712923
 
 

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Do Bond Issuers Shop for Favorable Credit Ratings?


Mathias Kronlund


University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

October 9, 2013


Abstract:     
This paper provides empirical evidence of ratings shopping among corporate bonds. Firms are more likely to solicit ratings from an agency that rated the firm relatively favorably in the past. This bias is strongest among bonds that are complex to rate, and in times when the Baa-Aaa spread is high. Furthermore, firms often delay the publication of unfavorable ratings, and strategically manage the number of ratings near a regulation-driven threshold. Bonds with a shopped rating are more likely to default, but investors account for this bias and demand higher yields for these bonds.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

Keywords: Ratings shopping, credit rating agencies, corporate bonds, regulation

JEL Classification: G10, G14, G18, G20, G28, G30, G38

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Date posted: November 22, 2010 ; Last revised: October 20, 2013

Suggested Citation

Kronlund, Mathias, Do Bond Issuers Shop for Favorable Credit Ratings? (October 9, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1712923 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1712923

Contact Information

Mathias Kronlund (Contact Author)
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )
1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
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