Corruption, Clients, and Political Machines: A Response to Professor Issacharoff
Stephen E. Sachs
Duke University School of Law
September 9, 2011
Harvard Law Review Forum, Vol. 124, pp. 62-71, 2011
In his comment on political corruption, Professor Samuel Issacharoff questions traditional accounts that aim to squeeze money out of politics entirely. Instead, he focuses on the danger that political spending will promote private influence over government policy. In this response, Professor Stephen E. Sachs argues that "private influence" is itself too broad a category to control, and that campaign finance policy should be restricted to a more manageable scope. Professor Sachs argues that if protecting the government from private influence is too diffuse a goal, we can at least attempt to protect the government from itself, by ensuring that it does not channel public resources into self-sustaining political machines.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 10
Keywords: campaign finance, corruption, clientelism
JEL Classification: H10, K30
Date posted: September 10, 2011 ; Last revised: December 28, 2014
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