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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1716306
 
 

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The Determinants of CEO Inside Debt and its Components


Wei Cen


Peking University - HSBC Business School

November 10, 2010


Abstract:     
I use the new SEC disclosure rule of 2006 to examine the role of CEO inside debt (pension plans and deferred compensation plans) in CEO compensation problem. I find that the contribution ratio of deferred compensation to total cash compensation is positively related to firm size, firm liquidity status, firm default risk, and executive personal wealth. In addition, I find a non-linear relation between firm leverage and CEO inside debt. The investigation shows that the underlying reasons for this non-linear relation may relate to firm financial distress and CEO risk aversion. This finding suggests that inside debt plays a more complex role in mitigating the asset substitution problem.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 60

Keywords: Inside Debt, Managerial Compensation, Capital Structure, Corporate Governance

JEL Classification: D23, G32, G38, J33, J44, M14, M52

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Date posted: November 28, 2010 ; Last revised: January 18, 2011

Suggested Citation

Cen, Wei, The Determinants of CEO Inside Debt and its Components (November 10, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1716306 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1716306

Contact Information

Wei Cen (Contact Author)
Peking University - HSBC Business School ( email )
HSBC Business School, Peking University
University Town, Nanshan District
Shenzhen, Guangdong
China
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