Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1716435
 
 

References (103)



 
 

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Explaining Preferences for Control Rights in Strategic Alliances: A Property Rights and Capabilities Perspective Approach


Carolin Häussler


University of Passau

Matthew John Higgins


Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

October 16, 2011


Abstract:     
Increases in alliance activity between research-intensive firms and incumbents is puzzling since it is challenging to contract upon highly uncertain R&D activities. Our paper extends prior research by exploring the relationship between firm capabilities and preferences for control rights. This link is important because the allocation of control rights has been shown to influence alliance outcomes. Using data based on a survey of biotechnology firms, we find that both current and future capabilities provide strong explanatory power for understanding preferences for control rights. Our results allow us to integrate aspects of the capabilities perspective into the property rights framework.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: Organizational Economics, Property Rights, Capabilities Perspective, Strategic Alliances, Contract Theory

JEL Classification: L14, M13, O32, D82

working papers series


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Date posted: November 29, 2010 ; Last revised: October 17, 2011

Suggested Citation

Häussler, Carolin and Higgins, Matthew John, Explaining Preferences for Control Rights in Strategic Alliances: A Property Rights and Capabilities Perspective Approach (October 16, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1716435 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1716435

Contact Information

Carolin Haeussler
University of Passau ( email )
Innstrasse 27
Passau, 94032
Germany
Matthew John Higgins (Contact Author)
Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business ( email )
800 West Peachtree Street
Atlanta, GA 30308
United States
404-894-4368 (Phone)
404-894-6030 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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