Improving Antibiotic Markets for Long Term Sustainability
Aaron S. Kesselheim
Brigham and Women's Hospital/Harvard Medical School; Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics
Boston University School of Law
November 29, 2010
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law & Ethics, Vol. 11, Winter 2011
Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper (Law & Economics) No. 10-42
Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper (Public Law & Legal Theory) No. 10-42
The world faces a worsening public health crisis: A growing number of bacteria are resistant to available antibiotics. Yet there are few new antibiotics in the development pipeline to take the place of these increasingly ineffective drugs. We review a number of proposals intended to bolster drug development, including such financial incentives for pharmaceutical manufacturers as extending the effective patent life for new antibiotics. However, such strategies directly conflict with the clear need to reduce unnecessary antibiotic prescriptions and could actually increase prescription use. As an alternative, we recommend a two-prong, “integrated” strategy based on prizes administered through the insurance reimbursement system, but conditioned on the companies meeting conservation targets.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 71
Keywords: antibiotic, resistance, intellectual property, patent, conservation, prize
JEL Classification: H41, H51, I18, K11, K19, K32, K33
Date posted: December 7, 2010 ; Last revised: April 16, 2013
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