Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1717976
 
 

References (19)



 


 



Ranking Asymmetric Auctions


Arieh Gavious


Ono Academic College; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Industrial Engineering and Management

Yizhaq Minchuk


Shamoon College of Engineering

Juen 1, 2011


Abstract:     
We compare the expected revenue in first- and second-price auctions with asymmetric bidders. We consider a "close to uniform" distributions with identical supports. In contrast to the common conjecture in the literature, we show that in the case of identical supports the expected revenue in second-price auction may exceed that in first-price auction. We also show that asymmetry over lower valuations has a higher negative impact on the expected revenue in first-price auction than in second-price auction. However, asymmetry over high valuations always increases the revenue in first-price auction.

Keywords: asymmetric auctions, ranking auctions, perturbation analysis, revenue equivalence

JEL Classification: D44, D72, D82

working papers series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: December 3, 2010 ; Last revised: September 16, 2014

Suggested Citation

Gavious, Arieh and Minchuk, Yizhaq, Ranking Asymmetric Auctions (Juen 1, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1717976 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1717976

Contact Information

Arieh Gavious (Contact Author)
Ono Academic College ( email )
Kyriat Ono
Israel
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Industrial Engineering and Management ( email )
Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
Yizhaq Minchuk
Shamoon College of Engineering ( email )
Basel street
Beer-Sheva, 84100
Israel
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