Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1718355
 
 

References (20)



 


 



Beating Thy Neighbor: Derby Effects in German Professional Soccer


Agnes Bäker


University of Tuebingen - School of Business and Economics; University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Mario Mechtel


University of Trier - Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Community

Karin Vetter


University of Tuebingen

December 1, 2010


Abstract:     
Derbies between two teams from the same city or region catch more public attention than "normal'' soccer matches. Terms such as "Old Firm" (Rangers vs. Celtic), "Merseyside" (Liverpool FC vs. Everton FC), "Superclásico'' (Boca Juniors vs. River Plate), and "Revierderby" (Dortmund vs. Schalke) are well-known even to people outside their respective countries of origin. Using data from the German Bundesliga from 1999 to 2009, we test whether derbies differ from other soccer matches with respect to the number of goals, match results, the number of scoring chances for both teams, and referee evaluations. We find some evidence for derby effects, for example, the home advantage of the home team with respect to the number of goals scored, the match result and the attempts vanishes whenever the match is a derby. With respect to the evaluation of the referee, we find evidence that sending-offs are associated with a lower referee performance grade in derbies. We conclude that referees make a greater number of wrong decisions in derbies with regard to sending-offs. However, when considering the overall marginal effects of a derby on our dependent variables, we find no significant differences between derbies and "normal" matches.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: soccer, team performance, city derby, Bundesliga

JEL Classification: L83, Z0

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: December 3, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Bäker, Agnes and Mechtel, Mario and Vetter, Karin, Beating Thy Neighbor: Derby Effects in German Professional Soccer (December 1, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1718355 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1718355

Contact Information

Agnes Bäker
University of Tuebingen - School of Business and Economics ( email )
Nauklerstr. 47
Tuebingen, Baden Wuerttemberg 72074
Germany
University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )
Gibbet Hill Rd.
Coventry, West Midlands CV4 8UW
United Kingdom
Mario Mechtel (Contact Author)
University of Trier - Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Community ( email )
Campus II - Building H
Trier, 54286
Germany
+496512014757 (Phone)
Karin Vetter
University of Tuebingen ( email )
Nauklerstr. 47
72074 Tuebingen, Baden Wuerttemberg 72074
Germany
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 889
Downloads: 112
Download Rank: 147,187
References:  20

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.594 seconds