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CEO Compensation Among Firms Controlled by Large Shareholders: Evidence from Emerging MarketsFrancisco A. GallegoPontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile Borja LarrainUniversidad Catolica de Chile september 1, 2010 Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile Documento de Trabajo No. 381, 2010 Abstract: Using a novel data base for three emerging markets, we find that the type of large shareholder matters for CEO compensation. In particular, we find a compensation premium of about 30 log points for professional (not controller-related) CEOs working in firms controlled by a family compared to firms controlled by other large shareholders. The premium cannot be explained away by standard firm characteristics, observable executive skills (e.g., education or tenure), or the compensation of the CEO in her former job. The premium comes mostly from family firms with absent founders and when sons are involved.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 50 working papers seriesDate posted: December 3, 2010Suggested CitationContact Information
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