Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
University College London
NYU Working Paper No. 2451/30283
We study the design of interventions to stabilize financial markets plagued by adverse selection. Our contribution is to analyze the information revealed by participation decisions. Taking part in a government program carries a stigma, and outside options are mechanism-dependent. We show that the effciency of an intervention can be assessed by its impact on the market interest rate. The presence of an outside market determines the nature of optimal interventions and the choice of financial instruments (debt guarantees in our model), but it does not affect implementation costs.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34
Keywords: adverse selection, market collapse, mechanism design, mechanism-dependent participation
Date posted: December 6, 2010
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