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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1719643
 
 

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After Copenhagen: The Impossibility of Carbon Trading


David Campbell


Lancaster University - Law School

M Klaes


University of Dundee

Christopher Bignell


Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

December 3, 2010

LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 22/2010

Abstract:     
The attempt to develop international cap and trade markets for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, ultimately aiming to determine a global price for carbon, is the most extensive attempt ever made to use market-mimicking mechanisms to deal with an environmental externality. Addressed to the problem of climate change, it is an exercise in the adjustment of the social welfare function on a global scale, and it envisages expenditures which will run into trillions of dollars. Focusing on the operation of the Clean Development Mechanism, the most important of the three flexible mechanisms for carbon trade established under the Kyoto Protocol, it will be argued that carbon trading which will reduce emissions in line with any of the targets set for avoiding dangerous anthropological interference is impossible. Climate change negotiations have completely failed to place a cap on global emissions; indeed, they have given a legal permission to increase them. Reflecting the fatal shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol, the operation of the CDM so far has not merely failed to secure reductions, but in all likelihood has actually increased the absolute level of emissions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

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Date posted: December 14, 2010 ; Last revised: June 1, 2013

Suggested Citation

Campbell, David and Klaes, M and Bignell, Christopher, After Copenhagen: The Impossibility of Carbon Trading (December 3, 2010). LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 22/2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1719643 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1719643

Contact Information

I. David Campbell (Contact Author)
Lancaster University - Law School ( email )
Law School
Lancaster, LA1 4YW
United Kingdom
Matthias Klaes
University of Dundee ( email )
University of Dundee
1 Perth road
Dundee, DD1 4HN
United Kingdom
Christopher Bignell
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law ( email )
55 Fifth Ave.
New York, NY 10003
United States
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