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Obama’s 'Czars' for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White House Staff

Aaron J. Saiger

Fordham University School of Law

May 19, 2011

Fordham Law Review, Vol. 79, p. 2577, 2011
Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1719746

President Obama has appointed a substantial number of high-profile, area-specific, domestic policy advisors to senior positions in the White House Office. The proliferation of these high-profile “czars,” as they have come to be known, represent a particular approach to the goal, shared by all modern presidents, of magnifying presidential influence over agency action in domestic policy. Czars provide Obama with an attractive synthesis of the technocratic advantages traditionally associated with the agency form and the political responsiveness ordinarily attributed to the White House staff. That synthesis, I argue, presents no constitutional problems; but it does increase the opacity of presidential influence over agencies to political accountability and legal controls. I therefore consider two categories of potential administrative-law response. One is to limit the ability of the president’s staff to interact with agencies: such contact could be forbidden, restricted, or saddled with transparency requirements. The other, better alternative is to relax some administrative constraints on agencies, and in particular to allow a president’s political preferences more easily to serve as a legitimate justification for agency decisions. Increased doctrinal room for a president to realize his political program by using the agency form will decrease his incentives to find politically and legally opaque ways to work such influence from the White House.

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Date posted: December 5, 2010 ; Last revised: May 22, 2011

Suggested Citation

Saiger, Aaron J., Obama’s 'Czars' for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White House Staff (May 19, 2011). Fordham Law Review, Vol. 79, p. 2577, 2011; Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1719746. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1719746

Contact Information

Aaron J. Saiger (Contact Author)
Fordham University School of Law ( email )
140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States
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