Outsourcing Enforcement: Principles to Guide Self-Policing Regimes
Sarah L. Stafford
College of William and Mary - Arts and Sciences; William & Mary Law School
November 17, 2010
Cardozo Law Review, 2011
In his book Outsourcing Sovereignty Paul Verkuil warns us to be wary of the possible threats to accountability and process in what has been a largely unexamined shift from private to public governance. This goal of this article is to examine particular form of outsourcing - the outsourcing of regulatory enforcement to regulated entities themselves, a practice known as self-policing - to determine whether this type of delegation of public power can be justified as being in the public interest. The article presents a case study of the Environmental Protection Agency’s self-policing program, assessing the extent to which it is a defensible form of outsourcing. Additionally the paper reviews a number of other federal self-policing programs and provides a brief assessment of their strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the article concludes with some general guidelines for self-policing programs that can help to minimize concerns about this form of outsourcing.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 29
Keywords: Self-Policing, Audit Policy, Voluntary Disclosure, Inherently Governmental Activities, AccountabilityAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: December 7, 2010
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.406 seconds