Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1721145
 
 

References (34)



 
 

Citations (4)



 


 



Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices


Matthew Grennan


University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

February 10, 2012


Abstract:     
Many important issues in business-to-business markets involve price discrimination and negotiated prices, situations where theoretical predictions are ambiguous. This paper uses new panel data on buyer-supplier transfers and a structural model to empirically analyze bargaining and price discrimination in a medical device market. While many phenomena that restrict different prices to different buyers are suggested as ways to decrease hospital costs (e.g., mergers, group purchasing organizations, and transparency), I find that: (1) more uniform pricing works against hospitals by softening competition; and (2) results depend ultimately on a previously unexplored bargaining effect.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53


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Date posted: December 7, 2010 ; Last revised: February 25, 2015

Suggested Citation

Grennan, Matthew, Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices (February 10, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1721145 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1721145

Contact Information

Matthew Grennan (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )
3641 Locust Walk
307 Colonial Penn Center
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/grennan.cfm
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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