Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1722372
 
 

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The Retail Investor Vote: Mobilizing Rationally Apathetic Shareholders to Preserve or Challenge the Board's Presumption of Authority


Christopher John Gulinello


Northern Kentucky University - Salmon P. Chase College of Law

September 1, 2010

Utah Law Review, Vol. 2010, No. 3, 2010

Abstract:     
The article proposes the implementation of the RIVI (“Retail Investor Voting Instructions”) to mobilize retail investors to vote in corporate elections. The author argues that current retail-investor voting has an adverse effect on our capital markets because it is uninformed. In this article, the author proposes the creation of the RIVI to promote more robust and informed retail-investor voting, which will, in turn, contribute to a more efficient balance between board accountability and authority in public companies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 57

Keywords: shareholders, shareholder voting, corporate governance, board of directors, authority, accountability, retail investors, capital markets

JEL Classification: G14, G18, G30, G34, G38

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Date posted: December 9, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Gulinello, Christopher John, The Retail Investor Vote: Mobilizing Rationally Apathetic Shareholders to Preserve or Challenge the Board's Presumption of Authority (September 1, 2010). Utah Law Review, Vol. 2010, No. 3, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1722372

Contact Information

Christopher John Gulinello (Contact Author)
Northern Kentucky University - Salmon P. Chase College of Law ( email )
Nunn Hall
Highland Heights, KY 41099
United States
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