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North-South Technology Transfer in Unionised Multinationals


Kjell Erik Lommerud


University of Bergen - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Frode Meland


University of Bergen - Department of Economics

Odd Rune Straume


University of Minho - Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

December 9, 2010

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3273

Abstract:     
We study how incentives for North-South technology transfers in multinational enterprises are affected by labour market institutions. If workers are collectively organised, incentives for technology transfers are partly governed by firms’ desire to curb trade union power. This will affect not only the extent but also the type of technology transfer. While skill upgrading of southern workers benefits these workers at the expense of northern worker welfare, quality upgrading of products produced in the South may harm not only northern but also southern workers. A minimum wage policy to raise the wage levels of southern workers may spur technology transfer, possibly to the extent that the utility of northern workers decline. These conclusions are reached in a setting where a unionised multinational multiproduct firm produces two vertically differentiated products in northern and southern subsidiaries, respectively.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: North-South technology transfer, multinationals, trade unions, minimum wages

JEL Classification: F23, J51, O33

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Date posted: December 9, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Lommerud, Kjell Erik, Meland, Frode and Straume, Odd Rune, North-South Technology Transfer in Unionised Multinationals (December 9, 2010). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3273. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1722534

Contact Information

Kjell Erik Lommerud
University of Bergen - Department of Economics ( email )
Fosswinckelsgt. 6
N-5007 Bergen
Norway
+47 5 558 9209 (Phone)
+47 5 558 9210 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Frode Meland
University of Bergen - Department of Economics ( email )
Fosswinckelsgt. 6
N-5007 Bergen
Norway
+47 5 558 9230 (Phone)
+47 5 558 9210 (Fax)
Odd Rune Straume (Contact Author)
University of Minho - Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE) ( email )
Campus de Gualtar
Braga, 4710-057
Portugal
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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