Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1724576
 
 

References (41)



 
 

Citations (3)



 


 



Brothers in Arms - An Experiment on the Alliance Puzzle


Kai A. Konrad


Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Changxia Ke


Lingnan (University) College, Sun Yat-sen University

Florian Morath


Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

December 1, 2010

WZB Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2010-18

Abstract:     
Our experimental analysis of alliances in conflicts leads to three main findings. First, even in the absence of repeated interaction, direct contact or communication, free-riding among alliance members is far less pronounced than what would be expected from non-cooperative theory. Second, this possible solidarity among 'brothers in arms' when fighting against an outside enemy may rapidly deteriorate or disappear as soon as the outside enemy disappears. Third, when fighting an outside enemy, 'brothers in arms' may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning; however, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest against the external enemy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: Alliance, conflict, contest, free-riding, hold-up problem, solidarity

JEL Classification: D72, D74

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: December 15, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A. and Ke, Changxia and Morath, Florian, Brothers in Arms - An Experiment on the Alliance Puzzle (December 1, 2010). WZB Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2010-18. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1724576 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1724576

Contact Information

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )
Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm
Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) ( email )
Reichpietschufer 50
Berlin, 10785
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.wzb.eu/mp/fff/people/kai_konrad.en.htm
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany
Changxia Ke
Lingnan (University) College, Sun Yat-sen University ( email )
135 Xingang Xi Road
Guangzhou, Guangdong 510275
China
Florian Morath
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )
Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 573
Downloads: 104
Download Rank: 102,241
References:  41
Citations:  3

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.328 seconds