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Game Over: Empirical Support for Soccer Bets Regulation


Emanuel V. Towfigh


Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; New York University School of Law

Andreas Glöckner


Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

October 1, 2009

MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2010/33

Abstract:     
In many countries, betting in sports is highly regulated. In Germany, however, there are current debates whether regulation should be loosened. A crucial part of the argument is that sport bets could be qualified as ‘games of skill’ that are considered to be less dangerous by German Law than ‘games of chance’, and are thus assumed to need less regulation. We explore this hypothesis in three incentivized online studies on soccer betting (N=214) and provide evidence against two crucial parts of this argument. First, we show that there are no overall effects of skill on accuracy in soccer bets and monetary earnings do not increase with skill. Hence, soccer betting cannot be considered a game of skill. Second, we show that soccer betting induces strong overconfidence and illusion of control, particularly for people who assume they have high skill, and that these biases lead to increased betting. Cognitive biases that might cause financial harm for bettors or even lead to problematic or pathological gambling behavior are even stronger for soccer bets compared to bets on the outcome of lotteries. Concerning the main aims of legal regulation for gambling in German law, our results strongly speak for regulation of soccer bets.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: Betting, Judgments, Overconfidence, Illusion of Control, Expertise

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Date posted: December 14, 2010 ; Last revised: December 21, 2010

Suggested Citation

Towfigh, Emanuel V. and Glöckner, Andreas, Game Over: Empirical Support for Soccer Bets Regulation (October 1, 2009). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2010/33. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1724602 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1724602

Contact Information

Emanuel V. Towfigh
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )
Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany
+49 228 91416-30 (Phone)
+49 228 91416-930 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de/team/page/emanuel_towfigh

New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-992-8117 (Phone)
Andreas Glöckner (Contact Author)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )
Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de/team/page/andreas_gloeckner

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