Taxing Guns vs. Taxing Crime: An Application of the 'Market for Offenses Model'
State University of New York at Buffalo - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Chicago - University of Chicago Press; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Nihon University College of Economics
August 3, 2010
Journal of Policy Modeling, Vol. 32, pp. 670-689, 2010
The interaction between offenders and potential victims has so far received relatively little attention in the literature on the economics of crime. The main objective of this paper is twofold: to extend the “market for offenses model” to deal with both “product” and “factor” markets, and to apply it to the case where guns are used for crime commission by offenders and for self-protection by potential victims. Our analysis offers new insights about the association between crime and guns and the limits it imposes on the efficacy of law enforcement and regulatory policies aimed to control both crime and guns.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 20
Keywords: Economics of Crime, Market for Offenses, Self-Protection, Law Enforcement, Regulation, Guncontrol, Strategic
JEL Classification: C72, D78, H49, K42Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: December 17, 2010
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