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Disclosure Requirements, the Release of New Information and Market Efficiency: New Insights from Agent-Based Models


Oliver Hermsen


University of Bamberg - Department of Economics

Björn-Christopher Witte


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Frank H. Westerhoff


affiliation not provided to SSRN

2010

Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Vol. 4, 2010-7

Abstract:     
We explore how disclosure requirements that regulate the release of new information may affect the dynamics of financial markets. Our analysis is based on three agent-based financial market models that are able to produce realistic financial market dynamics. We discover that the average deviation between market prices and fundamental values increases if new information is released with a delay, while the average price volatility is virtually unaffected by such regulations. Interestingly, the tails of the distribution of returns become fatter if fundamental data is released less continuously, indicating an increase in financial market risk. --

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: Agent-based financial market models, market efficiency, release of new information, disclosure requirements, regulation of financial markets, Monte Carlo analysis

JEL Classification: G14, G18

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Date posted: December 18, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Hermsen, Oliver, Witte, Björn-Christopher and Westerhoff, Frank H., Disclosure Requirements, the Release of New Information and Market Efficiency: New Insights from Agent-Based Models (2010). Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Vol. 4, 2010-7. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1726900 or http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2010-7

Contact Information

Oliver Hermsen (Contact Author)
University of Bamberg - Department of Economics ( email )
Bamberg 96045
Germany
Björn-Christopher Witte
affiliation not provided to SSRN
No Address Available
Frank H. Westerhoff
affiliation not provided to SSRN
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