Do Rating Agencies Cater? Evidence from Rating-Based Contracts
New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; New York University (NYU) - Department of Accounting, Taxation & Business Law
August 15, 2014
I examine whether rating agencies cater to borrowers with rating-based performance-priced loan contracts (PPrating firms). I use data from Moody's Financial Metrics on its quantitative adjustments for off-balance-sheet debt and qualitative adjustments for soft factors. In the cross-section and for borrowers experiencing adverse economic shocks, I find that these adjustments are more favorable for PPrating firms than for other firms, consistent with rating agencies catering to the PPrating borrowers. I find that this catering is muted in two circumstances when rating agencies' reputational costs are higher than usual: (1) near the investment grade and prime short-term rating thresholds and (2) when Fitch Ratings also provides a rating.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45
Keywords: Rating agency, off-balance-sheet finance, hard and soft information, debt contracting
JEL Classification: G24, M41working papers series
Date posted: December 18, 2010 ; Last revised: September 29, 2014
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