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Consumer Cooperatives and Welfare in a Mixed Oligopoly


Marco A. Marini


Sapienza Università di Roma ; CREI, University Rome III

Alberto Zevi


affiliation not provided to SSRN

July 10, 2010

University of Urbino Economics, Mathematics and Statistics Working Paper No. 2010/10

Abstract:     
Consumer co-operatives constitute a highly successful example of democratic forms of enterprises operating in developed countries. They are usually organized as medium or large-scale firms competing with profit-seeking firms in retail industries. In this paper we model such a situation as a mixed oligopoly in which consumer co-operatives maximize consumer-members' utilities and distribute them a patronage rebate on their goods purchase. We show that when consumers possess quasilinear preferences over a bundle of symmetrically differentiated goods and firms operate with a linear technology, the presence of consumer co-operatives positively affects all industries output and social welfare. The effect of co-ops on welfare is shown to be more significant when goods are either complements or highly differentiated and when competition is à la Cournot rather than à la Bertrand.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: Consumer Co-operatives, Profi…t-maximizing Firms, Mixed Oligopoly

JEL Classification: L21, L22, L31

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Date posted: December 18, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Marini, Marco A. and Zevi, Alberto, Consumer Cooperatives and Welfare in a Mixed Oligopoly (July 10, 2010). University of Urbino Economics, Mathematics and Statistics Working Paper No. 2010/10. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1727534 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1727534

Contact Information

Marco A. Marini (Contact Author)
Sapienza Università di Roma ( email )
Via Ariosto, 25
Rome, 00181
Italy
+390677274044 (Phone)
+390677274033 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.dis.uniroma1.it/marini/
CREI, University Rome III ( email )
Via Ostiense, 161
Rome, 00154
Italy
HOME PAGE: http://host.uniroma3.it/centri/crei/
Alberto Zevi
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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