Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1728151
 
 

References (8)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Market Sentiment: A Tragedy of the Commons


Tarek A. Hassan


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Thomas M. Mertens


Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

January 17, 2011

Fama-Miller Working Paper
Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 11-07

Abstract:     
We present a model with dispersed information in which investors decide whether or to what degree they want to allow their behavior to be influenced by "market sentiment". Investors who choose to insulate their decision from market sentiment earn higher expected returns, but incur a small mental cost. We show that if information is moderately dispersed across investors, even a very small mental cost (on the order of 0.001% of consumption) may generate a significant amount of sentiment in equilibrium: Individuals who choose to be swayed by sentiment increase uncertainty about the future and make it less costly for others to be swayed by sentiment as well. Market sentiment thus emerges as a tragedy of the commons.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 6

Keywords: Noisy Rational Expectations, Sentiment, Dispersed Information

JEL Classification: D8, G11, G14


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Date posted: December 19, 2010 ; Last revised: July 29, 2011

Suggested Citation

Hassan, Tarek A. and Mertens, Thomas M., Market Sentiment: A Tragedy of the Commons (January 17, 2011). Fama-Miller Working Paper; Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 11-07. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1728151 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1728151

Contact Information

Tarek Alexander Hassan (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/tarek.hassan/index.html

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Thomas M. Mertens
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco ( email )
101 Market Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
United States
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