Road Pricing as a Citizen-Candidate Game

European Transport/Trasporti Europei, No. 31, pp. 28-45, 2005

18 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2010

See all articles by Edoardo Marcucci

Edoardo Marcucci

Università degli Studi di Urbino, "Carlo Bo"

Marco A. Marini

Marco A. Marini; University of Rome La Sapienza

Davide Ticchi

Marche Polytechnic University; affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: 2005

Abstract

We construct a political economy model to analyze the political acceptability of road pricing policies. We use a citizen-candidate framework with a population composed by three groups differing for their income level. We show that road pricing policies are never applied when there is no redistribution of the resources in favour of other modes of transport or when the congestion of these types of transport is relatively high. The results suggest that the efficiency of the redistribution of resources from road to the alternative types of transport as well as the fraction of the population that uses the road transport are key factors in explaining the adoption of road pricing schemes.

Keywords: Road pricing; Political acceptability; Citizen-candidate.

JEL Classification: L90, L91, L92

Suggested Citation

Marcucci, Edoardo and Marini, Marco A. and Ticchi, Davide, Road Pricing as a Citizen-Candidate Game (2005). European Transport/Trasporti Europei, No. 31, pp. 28-45, 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1728758

Edoardo Marcucci

Università degli Studi di Urbino, "Carlo Bo" ( email )

61029 Urbino
Italy
+39+348+0687535 (Phone)
+06+5127788 (Fax)

Marco A. Marini (Contact Author)

Marco A. Marini ( email )

Piazzale Aldo Moro, 5
Roma, 00185
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/a/uniroma1.it/marcomarini/

University of Rome La Sapienza ( email )

29
Roma, 00185
Italy
+39 06 49910843 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/a/uniroma1.it/marcomarini

Davide Ticchi

Marche Polytechnic University ( email )

Piazzale Martelli 8
Ancona, AN 60121
Italy
60121 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://works.bepress.com/davideticchi/

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
120
Abstract Views
1,125
Rank
419,528
PlumX Metrics