Trade Policy and Antitrust: Do Consumers Matter to Legislators?

Review of International Economics, Forthcoming

27 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2010

See all articles by Robert M. Feinberg

Robert M. Feinberg

American University - Department of Economics

Thomas A. Husted

American University - Department of Economics

Kara M. Reynolds

American University - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 15, 2010

Abstract

We provide one of the first efforts to measure the importance of consumer preferences in legislators’ trade policy decisions by estimating the degree to which the level of antitrust enforcement in the legislator’s state impacts his or her vote on free trade agreements. To the extent that antitrust and trade liberalization are both viewed as pro-consumer in nature, we would expect to see a positive relationship between antitrust enforcement in their legislative district and Congressional votes in support of trade liberalization. We find evidence suggesting that consumer preferences do play a role in legislative decisions on trade policy.

Keywords: FTAs, Antitrust

JEL Classification: F13, L4

Suggested Citation

Feinberg, Robert M. and Husted, Thomas A. and Reynolds, Kara M., Trade Policy and Antitrust: Do Consumers Matter to Legislators? (October 15, 2010). Review of International Economics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1728830

Robert M. Feinberg (Contact Author)

American University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20016-8029
United States
202-885-3770 (Phone)
202-885-3790 (Fax)

Thomas A. Husted

American University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20016-8029
United States

Kara M. Reynolds

American University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20016-8029
United States
202-885-3768 (Phone)
202-885-3790 (Fax)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
80
Abstract Views
784
Rank
551,205
PlumX Metrics