Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1729135
 
 

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Private and Public Control of Management


Charles Angelucci


University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Martijn A. Han


Humboldt University of Berlin

July 13, 2011

Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2010-14

Abstract:     
This paper investigates the design of a leniency policy to fight corporate crime. The manager may breach the law and report evidence to the authority. The shareholder writes the manager's incentive scheme and possibly reports evidence to the authority. The authority designs a leniency policy to deter fraud by both (i) exacerbating agency problems within non-compliant firms and (ii) alleviating them within compliant firms. Depending on the authority's ability to sanction the manager, it may be socially desirable to instigate a "within-firm race to the courthouse".

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Keywords: Corporate crime, white-collar crime, leniency, compliance, antitrust

JEL Classification: L20, K20, K42

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Date posted: December 21, 2010 ; Last revised: July 23, 2012

Suggested Citation

Angelucci, Charles and Han, Martijn A., Private and Public Control of Management (July 13, 2011). Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2010-14. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1729135 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1729135

Contact Information

Charles Angelucci
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )
Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France
Martijn A. Han (Contact Author)
Humboldt University of Berlin ( email )
Spandauer Str. 1
Berlin, Berlin 10785
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.martijnhan.com
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