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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1729268
 
 

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The Robustness of Robust Implementation


Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn


Independent

Stephen Morris


Princeton University - Department of Economics

June 22, 2010

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 002-2010

Abstract:     
We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement ε-optimal outcomes in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of ε-optimal outcomes is thus robust to small perturbations of the environment. This is in contrast to ex-post implementation which is not robust in this sense as only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable in generic environments.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

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Date posted: December 22, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moritz and Morris, Stephen, The Robustness of Robust Implementation (June 22, 2010). Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 002-2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1729268 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1729268

Contact Information

Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn (Contact Author)
Independent ( email )
Sonnenbichlweg 9
85748 Garching
Germany
Stephen Edward Morris
Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

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