Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics
Princeton University - Department of Economics
National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
July 18, 2014
Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 008-2014
We identify a universal type space of possible interdependent (expected utility) preferences of a group of agents satisfying two criteria. First, a type consists of a "detail free" description, in a natural language, of the agents' interdependent preferences. Second, distinct types in the universal type space must be strategically distinguishable in the sense that there must exist a mechanism where those types are guaranteed to behave differently in equilibrium.
Our results generalize and unify results of Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) (who characterized strategic distinguishability on fixed fi nite type spaces) and Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006), (2007) (who characterized strategic distinguishability on type spaces without preference uncertainty and thus without interdependent preferences).
Number of Pages in PDF File: 52
Keywords: Interdependent Preferences, Higher-Order Preference Hierarchy, Universal Type Space, Strategic Distinguishability
JEL Classification: C79, D82, D83
Date posted: December 22, 2010 ; Last revised: July 19, 2014
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