|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
Interdependent Preferences and Strategic DistinguishabilityDirk BergemannYale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics Stephen MorrisPrinceton University - Department of Economics Satoru TakahashiNational University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics February 28, 2011 Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 008-2011 Abstract: A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional preferences; and so on. Two types are said to be strategically indistinguishable if they have an equilibrium action in common in any mechanism that they play. We show that two types are strategically indistinguishable if and only if they have the same preference hierarchy. We examine how this result extends to alternative solution concepts and strategic relations between types.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 43 Keywords: Interdependent Preferences, Higher-Order Preference Hierarchy, Universal Type Space, Strategic Distinguishability JEL Classification: C79, D82, D83 working papers seriesDate posted: December 22, 2010 ; Last revised: March 19, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo5 in 2.782 seconds
