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Bargaining in the Shadow of the European Settlement Procedure for Cartels


Maarten Pieter Schinkel


University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE); Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA)

December 22, 2010

Antitrust Bulletin, Forthcoming
Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2010-17

Abstract:     
In its recently implemented settlement procedure for cartels, the European Commission pledges not to negotiate the appropriate sanction. The Commission offers a take-it-or-leave-it 10% reduction of the ultimate fine only in exchange for acknowledgment of the facts. Yet there are at least three dimensions open for bargaining in cartel cases. One is the determination of the fine base to which the 10% reduction is applied. A second is the additional percentages of fine reductions that are awarded to subsequent leniency applicants. A third is the phrasing that the Commission uses in its public communications about the case – including the eventually published formal decision. The Commission’s consistent negation of any negotiation space may well be part of its bargaining strategy. The door on fine discount discussions shut, talks are channeled to the other bargaining points, where the Commission has more leeway to find an agreement. By disabling the only hard bargaining point, however, the Commission may unintentionally have put itself in a weak bargaining position. To avoid detrimental effects on the overall deterrence of cartels in Europe, the European Commission should credibly commit itself to being a tough negotiator, if not by enabling individual percentage fine reductions after all, then by embedding a binding and full independent review of all settlement proposals in the procedure.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: Cartel, Settlement, Fines, Antitrust Damages

JEL Classification: C78, K21, K40, L40

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Date posted: December 22, 2010 ; Last revised: March 30, 2011

Suggested Citation

Schinkel, Maarten Pieter, Bargaining in the Shadow of the European Settlement Procedure for Cartels (December 22, 2010). Antitrust Bulletin, Forthcoming; Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2010-17. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1729640

Contact Information

Maarten Pieter Schinkel (Contact Author)
University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE) ( email )
Roetersstraat 11
1018 WB Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 525 7132 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5318 (Fax)
Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA) ( email )
Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands
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