Relational Contracts and the Economic Well-Being of Nations
affiliation not provided to SSRN
University of Passau; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)
IZA Discussion Paper No. 5394
Informal long-term relationships and mutual confidence play a crucial role in modern economies in at least two dimensions. First, the performance of firms is strongly affected by their capacity to solve organizational questions effectively and this capacity is apparently strongly related to their ability to maintain informal long-term relationships. Second, countries that are better at maintaining unwritten agreements and where interactions are more strongly guided by a sense of trust fare better in terms of economic welfare than others. This paper provides a simple general equilibrium model which reconciles these two findings: we offer a micro-founded explanation of how the trust that prevails in an economy gets transmitted into higher economic well-being and we thereby highlight the role of managers with low time preference. Our analysis builds on the model of Antràs and Helpman (2004) and a formalization of the notion of relational contracting developed in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002).
Number of Pages in PDF File: 48
Keywords: relational contracting, theory of the firm, aggregate welfare, firm heterogeneity
JEL Classification: D23, F14, L14, L22working papers series
Date posted: December 27, 2010
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.781 seconds