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Brothers in Arms - An Experiment on the Alliance PuzzleChangxia KeMax Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Kai A. KonradMax Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Florian MorathMax Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance January 2011 Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2011-04 Abstract: Our experimental analysis of alliances in conflicts leads to three main findings. First, even in the absence of repeated interaction, direct contact or communication, free-riding among alliance members is far less pronounced than what would be expected from non-cooperative theory. Second, this possible solidarity among "brothers in arms" when fighting against an outside enemy may rapidly deteriorate or disappear as soon as the outside enemy disappears. Third, when fighting an outside enemy, "brothers in arms" may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning; however, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest against the external enemy.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 39 Keywords: Alliance, conflict, contest, free-riding, hold-up problem, solidarity JEL Classification: D72, D74 working papers seriesDate posted: December 30, 2010 ; Last revised: October 31, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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