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Sex Work and Infection: What's Law Enforcement Got to Do With It?


Paul J. Gertler


University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Manisha Shah


UCLA School of Public Affairs; NBER

2011

Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 54, November 2011

Abstract:     
A number of countries are pursuing the regulation of sex work in order to decrease the spread of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and to reduce the probability of a generalized HIV/AIDS epidemic. We study the effects of enforcing licensing regulation laws on sex worker STI rates using nationally representative sex worker data from Ecuador. We find that increasing enforcement in the street sector significantly decreases STIs. However, increasing enforcement in the brothel sector increases the probability of a sex worker ever being infected with any STI. Increasing enforcement in the street shifts some sex workers from the more risky street into the less risky brothels and increases street prices, reducing the overall number of street clients. As a result overall infection rates fall. In contrast, increasing enforcement in the brothel sector can exacerbate public health problems by inducing some unlicensed brothel sex workers into the riskier street sector.

Keywords: regulation, health, sex markets

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: December 31, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Gertler, Paul J. and Shah, Manisha, Sex Work and Infection: What's Law Enforcement Got to Do With It? (2011). Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 54, November 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1732022

Contact Information

Paul J. Gertler
University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )
545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-1418 (Phone)
510-642-4700 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Manisha Shah (Contact Author)
UCLA School of Public Affairs ( email )
Box 951656
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1656
United States
HOME PAGE: http://publicaffairs.ucla.edu/manisha-shah
NBER ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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