Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1732290
 
 

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Strategic Naval Inspection for Port Safety and Security


Kevin X. Li


Hong Kong Polytechnic University - Department of Logistics

Charles S. Tapiero


NYU Poly - Department of Finance and Risk Engineering

December 27, 2010


Abstract:     
Both risk externalities and moral hazard have conjured to induce risks of substantial consequences. These require both complex and creative regulation as well as control to inspect and prevent potential perpetrators. Sovereign maritime and port responsibilities are affected by such problems including for example, sea pollution by ships, terrorist attacks on ship lanes as well as ship owners seeking to bypass ports regulations. For this reason the control of both ship lanes and ports has become increasingly acute. The purpose of this paper is to outline “a random payoffs game-theoretical framework” for naval and ship inspections that enter a port such as New York or Hong Kong. Based on the problems results we discuss the effects and the implication of inspection cost and their derivatives. A number of examples are used to highlight some essential results. Extensions and conclusions for the inspection of potentially non-complying ship operators to regulation and sub-standard performance are also discussed to provide areas of further research.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: Inspection Policy, Maritime Controls, Safety, Regulation, Bi-Matrix Game, Random Payoff Games, Risk Analysis

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Date posted: December 31, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Li, Kevin X. and Tapiero, Charles S., Strategic Naval Inspection for Port Safety and Security (December 27, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1732290 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1732290

Contact Information

Kevin X. Li
Hong Kong Polytechnic University - Department of Logistics ( email )
Hong Kong
HOME PAGE: http://www.lgt.polyu.edu.hk
Charles S. Tapiero (Contact Author)
NYU Poly - Department of Finance and Risk Engineering ( email )
Brooklyn, NY 11201
United States
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