Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1732392
 
 

References (23)



 
 

Citations (4)



 


 



The Price Effect of Eliminating Potential Competition: Evidence from an Airline Merger


John E. Kwoka, Jr.


Northeastern University - Department of Economics

Evgenia Shumilkina


Northeastern University

December 24, 2010

The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 58, Issue 4, pp. 767-793, 2010

Abstract:     
This paper analyzes the gain in pricing power that a firm achieves by merging with a potential competitor in its market. Using pricing data for the merger of USAir and Piedmont, empirical analysis finds that prices rose by 5.0 to 6.0 per cent on routes that one carrier served and the other was a potential entrant. This was more than half the increase on routes where the two carriers had been direct competitors. Other important factors included carrier size, market concentration, incumbent's identity and the potential entrant's presence at one or both endpoints.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: December 30, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Kwoka, Jr., John E. and Shumilkina, Evgenia, The Price Effect of Eliminating Potential Competition: Evidence from an Airline Merger (December 24, 2010). The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 58, Issue 4, pp. 767-793, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1732392 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00433.x

Contact Information

John E. Kwoka (Contact Author)
Northeastern University - Department of Economics ( email )
301 Lake Hall
Boston, MA 02115
(617) 373-2882 (Phone)
(617) 373-3640 (Fax)
Evgenia Shumilkina
Northeastern University ( email )
Boston, MA 02115
United States
Feedback to SSRN


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References:  23
Citations:  4

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