Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1732754
 
 

References (27)



 
 

Citations (4)



 


 



Do Firms Contract Efficiently on Past Performance When Hiring External CEO's?


Richard A. Cazier


Texas Christian University

John M. McInnis


University of Texas at Austin - Department of Accounting

December 30, 2010


Abstract:     
Prior research finds that firms tend to select external CEO hires from companies with superior past performance and that this past performance is associated with a compensation premium in the hiring firm. We test whether this pay premium is associated with future performance in the hiring firm. We find that the pay premium for predecessor firm performance, though economically significant, does not predict higher performance in hiring firms. In fact, we document a negative relation between this pay premium and future performance. We also find external CEOs’ prior firm performance is not associated with a pay premium in the years subsequent to the year of hire. Finally, we find that measures of board inattentiveness predict the degree to which boards rely on prior firm performance to evaluate external CEO candidates. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that boards over-weight executives' prior firm performance when evaluating external CEO candidates.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: External CEOs, Executive Labor Markets, Executive Compensation

JEL Classification: G34, J33

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Date posted: December 31, 2010 ; Last revised: May 3, 2011

Suggested Citation

Cazier, Richard A. and McInnis, John M., Do Firms Contract Efficiently on Past Performance When Hiring External CEO's? (December 30, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1732754 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1732754

Contact Information

Richard A. Cazier (Contact Author)
Texas Christian University ( email )
Fort Worth, TX 76129
United States
John M. McInnis
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Accounting ( email )
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-232-6791 (Phone)
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