Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1733369
 
 

References (14)



 


 



Farsighted Coalitional Stability of a Price Leadership Cartel


Yoshio Kamijo


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Shigeo Muto


affiliation not provided to SSRN

November 23, 2010

Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 61, Issue 4, pp. 455-465, 2010

Abstract:     
This paper analyzes the farsighted behaviour of firms that form a dominant price leadership cartel. We consider stability concepts such as the farsighted core, the farsighted stable sets, and the largest consistent set. We show that: (i) the farsighted core is either an empty set or a singleton set of the grand cartel; (ii) any Pareto efficient cartel is itself a farsighted stable set; and (iii) the set of cartels in which fringe firms enjoy higher profits than the firms in the minimal Pareto efficient cartel is the largest consistent set.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 11

JEL Classification: C71, D43, L13

Accepted Paper Series





Date posted: January 1, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Kamijo, Yoshio and Muto, Shigeo, Farsighted Coalitional Stability of a Price Leadership Cartel (November 23, 2010). Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 61, Issue 4, pp. 455-465, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1733369 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2009.00499.x

Contact Information

Yoshio Kamijo
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Shigeo Muto
affiliation not provided to SSRN
No Address Available
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References:  14

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