Roy J. Epstein
Daniel L. Rubinfeld
University of California at Berkeley - School of Law; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); NYU Law School
January 2, 2011
Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro have proposed a measure of Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) as offering a presumption of anticompetitive unilteral effects in a merger. We explain that the underlying framework (which relies on Bertrand competition) is in fact a special case of a more general merger simulation methodology. We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the framework as a policy tool.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 10
Keywords: merger analysis, unilateral effects
JEL Classification: L40, L10working papers series
Date posted: January 4, 2011
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