Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=173458
 
 

References (17)



 
 

Citations (51)



 
 

Footnotes (6)



 


 



Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions


Eugene F. Fama


University of Chicago - Finance

Michael C. Jensen


Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc.; Harvard Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS, Harvard University Press, December 2000, (Book)

Abstract:     
This paper analyzes investment rules for various organizational forms that are distinguished by the characteristics of their residual claims. Different restrictions on residual claims lead to different decision rules. The analysis indicates that the investment decisions of open corporations, financial mutuals and nonprofits can be modeled by the value maximization rule. However, the decisions of proprietorships, partnerships, and closed corporations cannot in general be modeled by the market value rule.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: organizational forms, investment, proprietorships, partnerships, closed corporations, market value rule, residual claims, open corporations

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: October 24, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Fama, Eugene F. and Jensen, Michael C., Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions. A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS, Harvard University Press, December 2000, (Book). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=173458 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.173458

Contact Information

Eugene F. Fama
University of Chicago - Finance ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-7282 (Phone)
773-702-9937 (Fax)
Michael C. Jensen (Contact Author)
Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc. ( email )
7858 Sanderling Road
Sarasota, FL 34242
United States
617-510-3363 (Phone)
305 675-3166 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://ssrn.com/author=9

Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field
Negotiations, Organizations & Markets
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-510-3363 (Phone)
305-675-3166 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&facId=6484
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 15,484
Downloads: 4,890
Download Rank: 751
References:  17
Citations:  51
Footnotes:  6

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.344 seconds