|
Based on your IP address, your paper is being delivered by:
|
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
New York, USA
Processing request.
|
Illinois, USA
Processing request.
|
Brussels, Belgium
Processing request.
|
Seoul, Korea
Processing request.
|
California, USA
Processing request.
|
If you have any problems downloading this paper,
please click on another Download Location above, or
File name: SSRN-id173458. ; Size: 220K
|
|
Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions
Eugene F. Fama
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business (Finance Authors)
Michael C. Jensen
Harvard Business School; Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc.; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS, Harvard University Press, December 2000, (Book)
Abstract:
This paper analyzes investment rules for various organizational forms that are distinguished by the characteristics of their residual claims. Different restrictions on residual claims lead to different decision rules. The analysis indicates that the investment decisions of open corporations, financial mutuals and nonprofits can be modeled by the value maximization rule. However, the decisions of proprietorships, partnerships, and closed corporations cannot in general be modeled by the market value rule.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30
Keywords: organizational forms, investment, proprietorships, partnerships, closed corporations, market value rule, residual claims, open corporations
Accepted Paper Series
Download This Paper
Date posted: October 24, 2000
Suggested CitationFama, Eugene F. and Jensen, Michael C., Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions. A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS, Harvard University Press, December 2000, (Book). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=173458 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.173458
|
| Feedback to SSRN (Beta) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
