Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=173459
 
 

Citations (59)



 
 

Footnotes (6)



 


 



The Distribution of Power Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors


Michael C. Jensen


Harvard Business School; Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc.; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Jerold B. Warner


Simon Graduate School of Business, University of Rochester

June 1, 1988

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 20, pp. 3-24, 1988
Michael C. Jensen, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMES AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS, Harvard University Press, December 2000
Harvard NOM Working Paper No. 00-09

Abstract:     
This article surveys the seventeen papers in this special issue of the Journal of Financial Economics, and related work. The major findings are: (1) patterns of stock ownership by insiders and outsiders can influence managerial behavior, corporate performance, and stockholder voting in election contests; (2) corporate leverage, inside stock ownership by managers, and the control market are interrelated; (3) departures from one share/one vote affect firm value and efficiency; (4) takeover resistance through defensive restructurings or poison pill provisions is associated with declines in share price; and (5) top management turnover is inversely related to share price performance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: Agency Costs, Managerial Stock Ownership, Insiders, Outsiders, Control Market, Corporate Performance, One Share/One Vote, Restructuring, Poison Pill Provisions, Performance

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: October 11, 2000 ; Last revised: February 24, 2012

Suggested Citation

Jensen, Michael C. and Warner, Jerold B., The Distribution of Power Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors (June 1, 1988). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 20, pp. 3-24, 1988; Michael C. Jensen, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMES AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS, Harvard University Press, December 2000; Harvard NOM Working Paper No. 00-09. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=173459 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.173459

Contact Information

Michael C. Jensen (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field
Negotiations, Organizations & Markets
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-510-3363 (Phone)
305-675-3166 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&facId=6484
Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc. ( email )
7858 Sanderling Road
Sarasota, FL 34242
United States
617-510-3363 (Phone)
305 675-3166 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://ssrn.com/author=9

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Jerold B. Warner
Simon Graduate School of Business, University of Rochester ( email )
Carol Simon Hall 3-160H
Rochester, NY 14627
United States
585-275-2678 (Phone)
585-442-6323 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 16,209
Downloads: 5,265
Download Rank: 631
Citations:  59
Footnotes:  6

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.625 seconds