Do Private Inspection Programs Affect Trade Facilitation?

32 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Irina Velea

Irina Velea

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne)

Olivier Cadot

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); World Bank

John S. Wilson

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Date Written: December 1, 2010

Abstract

Private inspection of international shipments has been used over the last half-century for a variety of purposes. These include prevention of capital flight and improvement of import duty collection, among others. The existing literature has failed to find much impact of these inspection programs on collected tariff revenue or corruption at the border. This paper explores the "facilitation" effect of private inspection programs on trade. The results indicate that private inspection has a positive and significant trade-facilitation effect. These programs raise import volumes for countries using them by approximately 2 to 10 percent. The findings here also suggest that the benefit of private inspection of imports may be associated with reforms and best practices applied by private inspection firms. Private firms' inspection of cargo may promote faster clearance times and process reliability, rather than improved tax collection.

Keywords: E-Business, Transport Economics Policy & Planning, Trade Law, Free Trade, Economic Theory & Research

Suggested Citation

Velea, Irina and Cadot, Olivier and Wilson, John S., Do Private Inspection Programs Affect Trade Facilitation? (December 1, 2010). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5515, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1734616

Irina Velea (Contact Author)

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne) ( email )

Unil Dorigny, Batiment Internef
Lausanne, 1015
Switzerland

Olivier Cadot

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne) ( email )

Unil Dorigny, Batiment Internef
Lausanne, 1015
Switzerland
+41 21 692 3463 (Phone)
+41 21 692 3495 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

John S. Wilson

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
74
Abstract Views
731
Rank
573,886
PlumX Metrics