Legal Means of Dispute Settlement in the Field of Collective Security: The Quasi-Judicial Powers of the Security Council
University of Oslo - Norwegian Centre for Human Rights; Pluricourts
Nigel D. White
University of Nottingham
March 3, 2010
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: NEW TECHNIQUES AND PROBLEMS, D. French, M. Saul, and N.D. White, eds., Hart, 2010
This chapter examines the role of and problems faced by the UN Security Council (SC) in relation to collective security and dispute settlement. The chapter is particularly interested in the effectiveness of the SC and how this could be improved. A central argument is that effectiveness is dependent upon legitimacy, which in large part includes respect for the canons of international law. Analysis is centred on the key dispute settlement functions undertaken by the SC: investigation, judgment, and implementation (enforcement). The focus is on the SC because it alone has the power to bind Member States, a power which is not shared by the UN General Assembly (GA), except in budgetary matters. This is not to suggest, of course, that the GA has no role in international dispute settlement, nor that it does not act in a quasi-judicial manner, but the absence of binding powers limits its impact. Similarly, mention of the SC as a legislature is only to the extent that a particular action is relevant for the analysis of its dispute settlement function.
Keywords: United Nations, Security Council, Dispute Settlement, International Law, Judicial, Collective SecurityAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: January 5, 2011
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