Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law
Steven L. Schwarcz
Duke University School of Law
October 21, 2011
Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 86, No. 4, p. 1349, 2011
UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 11-01
The global financial crisis demonstrated the inability and unwillingness of financial market participants to safeguard the stability of the financial system. It also highlighted the enormous direct and indirect costs of addressing systemic crises after they have occurred, as opposed to attempting to prevent them from arising. Governments and international organizations are responding with measures intended to make the financial system more resilient to economic shocks, many of which will be implemented by regulatory bodies over time. These measures suffer, however, from the lack of a theoretical account of how systemic risk propagates within the financial system and why regulatory intervention is needed to disrupt it. In this Article, we address this deficiency by examining how systemic risk is transmitted. We then proceed to explain why, in the absence of regulation, market participants cannot be relied upon to disrupt or otherwise limit the transmission of systemic risk. Finally, we advance an analytical framework to inform systemic risk regulation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 64
Keywords: financial markets, systemic risk, financial crisis
Date posted: January 6, 2011 ; Last revised: December 28, 2014
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